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Abstract. In multi-agent systems, software agents are modelled to pos-
sess characteristics and behaviour borrowed from human societies. Norms
are expectations of behaviours of the agents in a society. Norms can be
established in a society in different ways. In human societies, there are
several types of norms such as moral norms, social norms and legal norms
(laws). In artificial agent societies, the designers can impose these norms
on the agents. Being autonomous, agents might not always follow the
norms. Monitoring and controlling mechanisms should be in place to en-
force norms. As the agents are autonomous, they themselves can evolve
new norms while adapting to changing needs. In order to design and
develop robust artificial agent societies, it is important to understand
different approaches proposed by researchers by which norms can spread
and emerge within agent societies. This paper makes two contributions
to the study of norms. Firstly, based on the simulation works on norms,
we propose a life-cycle model for norms. Secondly, we discuss different
mechanisms used by researchers to study norm creation, spreading, en-
forcement and emergence.
1 Introduction
In human societies, norms have played an important role in governing behaviour
of the individuals in a society. Norms are the societal rules that govern the
prescription and proscription of certain behaviour . Norms improve cooperation
[1] and coordination among agents [2]. Norms reduce the amount of computation
required by the agents [3] as the agents do not have to search their entire state
space if they were to follow norms.
Artificial agent societies are societies in a networked environment where var-
ious agents share a virtual space and perform certain actions in a particular
context (e.g. auctions). These agent societies are modelled using some of the
social constructs borrowed from the human society. There have been two ap-
proaches for building normative behaviour in an agent. The first approach is the
prescriptive approach where an institutional mechanism specifies how the agents
should behave. The second approach is the bottom-up approach that could be
used in open environments by employing mechanisms that can help a norm to
emerge and govern the behaviour of an agent.
The advent of digital virtual environments such as Second Life [4] call for
a distributed approach to norm spreading and emergence. Centralized policing
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mechanism for such digital societies would be expensive from the view point
of computation required due to the explosion of the states of the agents. It is
impossible to monitor and control millions of agents assuming numerous roles
through a centralized enforcer. A distributed approach to norms addresses these
problems. Both of these approaches have been addressed by researchers and the
current works focus on the issues associated with the distributed approach.
A “norm capable” agent society is the one that is able to generate, distribute,
enforce and modify norms. Building robust agent societies that can create and
evolve norms is important because the framework that helps in recognizing these
norms will also be helpful for the agents to dynamically change these norms if
situations warrant it. A good approach to test models of norm capable societies
are simulations. So, a first step towards building such norm capable societies is
to understand the existing simulation works on norms. To that extent, based on
the simulation works on norms, we propose a life-cycle model for norms in the
first part of the paper and in the second part of the paper we categorize the
research works on norms based on the mechanisms employed by each of works.
2 What are norms?
Norms are expectations of an agent about the behaviour of other agents in the
society. The human society follows norms such as tipping in restaurants and
exchange of gifts at Christmas. Norms have been so much a part of different
cultures, it is not surprising that it is an active area of research in a variety
of fields including Sociology, Economics, Biology and Computer Science. Social
norms have been of interest to multi-agent researchers since the early nineties.
Norms are of interest to multi-agent system (MAS) researchers as they help in
sustaining social order and increase the predictability of behaviour in the society.
However, software agents tend to deviate from these norms due to their auton-
omy. So, the study of norms has become crucial to MAS researchers as they can
build robust multi-agent systems using the concept of norms and also experiment
with how norms evolve and adapt in response to environmental changes.
Due to multi-disciplinary interest in norms, several definitions for norms ex-
ist. Habermas [5], a renowned sociologist, identified norm-regulated actions as
one of the four action patterns in human behaviour. A norm to him means fulfill-
ing a generalized expectation of behaviour, which is a widely accepted definition
for social norms. Ullman-Margalit [6] describes a social norm as a prescribed
guide for conduct or action which is generally complied with by the members of
the society. She states that norms are the resultant of complex patterns of be-
haviour of a large number of people over a protracted period of time. Coleman [7]
describes “I will say that a norm concerning a specific action exists when the
socially defined right to control the action is held not by the actor but by others”.
Elster notes the following about social norms [1]. “For norms to be social, they
must be shared by other people and partly sustained by their approval and dis-
approval. They are sustained by the feelings of embarrassment,anxiety, guilt and
shame that a person suffers at the prospect of violating them. A person obeying
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a norm may also be propelled by positive emotions like anger and indignation ...
social norms have a grip on the mind that is due to the strong emotions they can
trigger”.
Researchers have divided norms into different categories. Tuomela [8] has
grouped norms into the following categories.
– r-norms (rule norms)
– s-norms (social norms)
– m-norms (moral norms)
– p-norms (prudential norms)
Rule norms are imposed by an authority based on an agreement between the
members (e.g. one has to pay taxes). Social norms apply to large groups such
as a whole society (e.g. one should not litter). Moral norms appeal to one’s
conscience (e.g. one should not steal or accept bribes). Prudential norms are
based on rationality (e.g one ought to maximize one’s expected utility). When
members of a society violate the societal norms, they may be punished.
Many social scientists have studied why norms are adhered to. Some of the
reasons for norm adherence include:
– fear of authority or power
– rational appeal of the norms
– emotions such as shame, guilt and embarrassment that arise because of non-
adherence.
– willingness to follow the crowd
Elster [1] categorizes norms into consumption norms (e.g. manners of dress),
behaviour norms (e.g. the norm against cannibalism), norms of reciprocity (e.g.
gift-giving norms), norms of cooperation (e.g. voting and tax compliance) etc.
For the purpose of this paper, we focus on social norms because the agents
in multi-agent systems have been modelled using ideas borrowed from sociology
such as speech act theory and autonomy. Software agents are the proxies for
human agents and possess these human-like attributes. Agents acting on behalf
of humans (e.g. in virtual worlds) or as independent entities (bots) will need this
notion of social norms that regulate their behaviour. Based on the definitions
provided by various researchers, we note that the notion of a norm is generally
made up of the following two aspects.
– Normative expectation of a behavioural regularity: There is a general agree-
ment within the society that a behaviour is expected on the part of an agent
(or actor) by others in a society, in a given circumstance.
– A norm spreading factor : Examples of norm spreading factors include the
notion of advice from powerful leaders and the sanctioning mechanism. When
an agent does not follow the norm, it could be subjected to a sanction.
The sanction could include monetary or physical punishment in the real
world which can trigger emotions (embarrassment, guilt etc.) or direct loss
of utility. Other kind of sanctions could include agents not being willing to
interact with an agent that violated the norm or the decrease of its reputation
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score. Other norm spreading factors include imitation and learning on the
part of an agent.
It should be noted that researchers are divided on what the differences be-
tween a norm and a convention are. Our belief is that convention is a common
expectation amongst (most) others that an agent adopts a particular action or
behaviour (e.g. the convention in ancient Rome was to drive on the left). In this
paper we do not distinguish conventions from norms. Both of them have been
incorporated under the umbrella of norms.
2.1 Normative multi-agent systems
Research on norms in multi-agent systems is about two decades old. [9–11].
Norms in multi-agent systems are treated as constraints on behaviour, goals to
be achieved or as obligations [12].
The definition of normative multi-agent systems as described by the re-
searchers involved in the NorMAS 2007 workshop is as follows [13]. A normative
multi-agent system is a multi-agent system organized by means of mechanism
to represent, communicate, distribute, detect, create, modify and enforce norms,
and mechanisms to deliberate about norms and detect norm violation and fulfill-
ment.
The research in normative multi-agent systems can be categorized into two
branches. The first branch focuses on normative system architectures, norm rep-
resentations, norm adherence and the associated punitive or incentive measures.
Lopez et al. [14] have designed an architecture for normative BDI agents and [15]
have proposed a distributed architecture for normative agents. Some researchers
are working on using deontic logic to define and represent norms [15, 16]. Sev-
eral researchers have worked on mechanisms for norm compliance and enforce-
ment [17–19]. A recent development is the research on emotion based mechanisms
for norm enforcement [20, 21]. Conte and Castelfranchi [22] have worked on an
integrated view of norms. Their work tries to bridge the gap between the pre-
scriptive view of norms and the emergence of conventions from mere regularities
using cognitive abilities of an agent. For a comparison of normative architectures
refer to Neumann’s article [23].
The second branch of research is related to emergence of norms. Neumann
has presented a case study of four research works on the simulation models of
norms from the perspective of foundations of social theory [24]. In this work, the
four papers were investigated in detail for identifying three methodological core
problems which are norm transmission, norm transformation and the function
of the norm. The first two problems correspond to the causal aspect of the norm
(i.e. what causes the norm to spread). The last problem deals with the purpose
of the norm. The author concludes that no model has been able to fully explain
both the causal and functional reasons behind norm emergence, however, the
current trend is towards bridging this gap.
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3 Phases of norm life-cycle
Researchers interested in norms have experimented with several mechanisms
associated with norms. Firstly we identify four phases of the norm life-cycle.
Secondly, we categorize the simulation mechanisms into 10 categories and have
assigned each category to a particular phase of the norm life-cycle.
In the body of research literature on social norms there isn’t a unified view
on how norms are created and spread in a society. Several researchers have
proposed models of norms [1,7,25–28]. In this paper we refer to four important
phases of norm life-cycle which are norm creation, spreading, enforcement and
emergence. Even though there hasn’t been any agreement on these phases by
social researchers, we use these four phases as they broadly capture the processes
associated with the norm life-cycle. Figure 1 shows the four phases of norm life-
cycle (in the left) and the categories of mechanisms (in the right).
Fig. 1: Phases of norm life-cycle and categories of simulation models
The first phase of the life-cycle model is that of norm creation. A norm
can be created by a designer of the system or a powerful leader. The designer
and leadership approaches are top-down authoritarian approaches. The other
approach for norm creation is the entrepreneurial approach where an agent might
come up with a norm and can recommend the norm to other agents. These norms
when created are the ”proposed norms”. Once such a proposed norm is created
by a designer, leader or entrepreuneur, it spreads through the society by one of
the spreading mechanisms such as advice about a norm by powerful members
of the society, imitation, learning on the part of the agents, cultural inheritance
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and evolutionary inheritance. Thus, norm spreading forms the second phase of
the norm life-cycle. When norms have spread and are internalized, agents may
expect other agents to follow the norm that they have subscribed to and may
sanction those agents that do not follow the norm. The third phase of the life-
cycle is the enforcement of norms where norm violators may be punished, their
utility might be reduced, their reputation impacted or emotions such as shame
and guilt being stirred which help in the regulation of normative behaviour. The
fourth phase is the norm emergence phase. A norm can be said to have emerged
if it has spread (i.e. it is followed by a considerable proportion of an agent society
and this fact is recognized by most agents). Another aspect of norm emergence is
that a norm can emerge without being explicitly created. Norms can emerge in a
bottom-up way. One or more cognitive agents, based on interactions in an agent
society can infer what the norms of the society are. We can say that these agents
derived a ”proposed norm” based on their cognitive ability (creation phase) and
then helped in the emergence of that norm (emergence phase). These cognitive
agents can also come up with an alternative norm that spreads and emerges in a
society and hence can replace an existing norm. This feedback loop is represented
as a dashed line in 1. It should be noted that not all simulation based research
on norms have considered all the 4 phases.
The life-cycle that we have presented is similar to Finnemore and Sikkink’s
model [27]. They have proposed three stages for the norm life cycle. The first
stage is the norm emergence stage which is characterized by the persuasion
by some norm entrepreneurs or norm innovators. Norm entrepreneurs are the
innovators who think about new ideas/norms in a society. Norm entrepreneurs
attempt to convince a critical mass of norm leaders to embrace new norms. The
second stage is characterized by the dynamics of imitation as the norm leaders
attempt to socialize with other people whom they might have influence over, so
they might become followers. The third stage is the norm cascade stage where
the followers take up the norm for reasons such as pressure to conform. As the
reader may observe, this model is a subset of the life-cycle model that we have
proposed. Also, this model caters for the entrepreneurial approach for norm
creation and the imitation approach for norm spreading. But, in our approach,
more mechanisms are brought under each of the phases.
3.1 Norm creation
Norm creation in multi-agent system refers to the mechanism by which an agent
in the society comes to know what the norm of the society is. There are three
approaches that simulation works have used and they are a) a designer spec-
ified norms (off-line design) b) a norm-leader specified norms and c) a norm-
entrepreneur considers that a norm is good for the society.
Off-line design approach - In this approach, norms are designed off-line,
and hardwired into agents. Walker and Wooldridge [29] note the following about
the off-line design of norms. “The off line design of norms will often be simpler
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to implement and might present the designer with a greater degree of control
over system functionality. However, there are a number of disadvantages with
this approach. First, it is not always the case that all the characteristics of a
system are known at design time; this is most obviously true of open systems
Secondly, in complex system the goals of agents might be constantly changing. To
keep reprogramming agents in such circumstances would be costly and inefficient.
Finally, the more complex the a system becomes, the less likely it is that system
designers will be able to design effective social laws”.
Some researchers have used this approach to compare the performance of a
normative system with a non normative one [30].This approach is only suitable
for top-down norm prescription that is a characteristic of closed and centralized
institutions.
Leadership approach - In this approach, some powerful agents in the society
(the norm-leaders) come up with a norm. The leader can provide these norms
to the follower agents [10,31].
Entrepreneurial approach - In agent societies, there might be some norm-
entrepreneurs who come up with a norm. When an agent comes up with a new
norm it tries to convince other agents [32].
Cognitive approach - One or more cognitive agents in a society can come
up with norms based on the deliberative processes that they employ [33]. In
this approach the agents have the cognitive ability to recognize what the norms
of a society are based on the observations of interactions. It should be noted
that the norm inferred by each agent might be different (which is based on the
observations that an agent has made). Thus, an agent in this model creates its
notion of what the norm is based on inference.
3.2 Norm spreading
Norm spreading relates to the distribution of a norm among a group. Mirriam-
Webster’s dictionary [34] defines spreading as to become dispersed, distributed,
or scattered or to become known or disseminated. There are several mechanisms
that help in spreading the norms such as leadership, imitation , machine learning,
cultural and evolutionary mechanisms. These mechanisms are discussed in detail
in the next section.
3.3 Norm enforcement
Norm enforcement refers to the process by which norm violators are discouraged
through some form of sanctioning. A widely used sanctioning mechanism is the
punishment of a norm violator (e.g. monetary punishment which reduces the
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agents fitness or a punishment that invokes emotions such as guilt and embar-
rassment). Reputation mechanisms have also been used as sanctions where an
agent is black-listed for not following a norm. The process of enforcement helps
to sustain norms in a society. Some researchers have considered enforcement as
a part of the spreading mechanism [19].
3.4 Norm emergence
We define norm emergence to be reaching some significant threshold in the extent
of the spread of a norm. For example, a society is said to have a norm of gift
exchange at Christmas if more than x% of the population follows such a practice.
The value of x varies from society to society and from one kind of norm to
another. The value of x has varied from 35 to 100 across different simulation
based studies of norms.
Simulation research on norms has employed two approaches to norm emer-
gence. One approach is that an agent comes to know about a norm through
mechanisms such as leadership [31, 35] or through imitation [3] and when it
accepts the norm it contributes to norm spreading and emergence. The other
way is that a cognitive agent could generate a personal norm based on observa-
tion [36]. Additionally many such cognitive agents in the society could generate
similar personal norms and for an external observer it might seem that a norm
has emerged in a society. Also, cognitive agents could communicate norms and
verify norms. The later bottom-up approach where micro interactions between
agents that lead to the macro effect of establishing a norm is more interesting
than the leadership and imitation based approaches.
4 Categorization of simulation works of norm creation,
spreading and emergence
In this section we categorize simulation work on norms into eight main categories
(shown in figure 2). Each category corresponds to a particular mechanism (e.g.
sanctioning mechanism, reputation mechanism). For each of these categories we
provide a brief description and discuss a few key papers. It should be noted
that some papers have made use of mechanisms that fall under more than one
category.
4.1 Social power
Social power plays an important role in societies in establishing order and en-
abling smoother functioning. Several researchers in normative multi-agent sys-
tems have focused on the notion of power [37–39] such as institutional power.
Lopez in her thesis on social power and norms notes that powers of an agent are
expressed through its abilities to change the beliefs, the motivations, and the
goals of other agents in such a way that its goals can be satisfied [40].
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Fig. 2: Categorization of simulation models
Sources of power could motivate, encourage or coerce their followers to take
up a particular norm (leadership approach) or force them to adopt a particular
norm based on sanctions (punishment approach). Researchers have experimented
with both types of social power approaches for norm spreading and enforcement.
Leadership mechanism - Leadership mechanisms are based on the notion
that there are certain leaders in the society. These leaders provide advice to
the agents in the society. The follower agents seek the leaders advice when de-
ciding about a norm. Verhagen [31] has used the concept of normative advice
(advice from the leader of a society) as one of the mechanisms for spreading
and internalizing norms in an agent society. However, this centralized approach
might not work well in open, flexible and dynamic societies. Savarimuthu et
al. [35] extended Verhagen’s model by adopting a distributed mechanism for
norm emergence. In their mechanism, there could be several normative advi-
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sors or role models whom other agents can request for advice. In this model, an
agent can be a leader for some agents while that agent itself can be a follower
of some other agent. Hoffmann [32] has experimented with the notion of norm
entrepreneurs who think of a norm that might be beneficial to the society. His
experiments explore the entrepreneurial norm dynamics and provide some initial
evidence for Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle model [27].
Sanction mechanism - Even though the models discussed above are based on
the notion of power and leadership, they do not include the notion of sanctioning
agents that do not follow the norm specified by a norm leader. Several works on
norms have used the notion of social power to inflict sanctions on agents that
do not follow a norm [17,19,41]. In his well known work [19], Axelrod has shown
how a meta-norm that defections should be punished can bring about the norm
of cooperation. Lopez et al. [17] have considered punishments and rewards in
their model. Their framework models agents with different personalities (social,
pressured, opportunistic, greedy, fearful, rebellious). A proper account of the
cost of punishment has not been considered in both these works. While Axelrod’s
work does not consider cost of punishment on the part of the sanctioning agent,
Lopez’s work assumes that a third party somehow bears this cost. Flentge et
al. [41] have shown how an agent comes to acquire a possession norm. They
have noted that sanctions help in the establishment of the possession norm if
the sanctioning costs are low or when there is no cost for sanctioning.
4.2 Reputation mechanism
Reputation refers to the positive or negative opinion about a person or agent
based on their interactions with others in the society. Researchers [42, 43] have
addressed how reputation models are beneficial in sustaining norms in an agent
society. They have experimented with the effect of the normative reputation on
the compliance costs of the norm. They have shown that the normative reputa-
tion of agents of the society helps in redistributing the costs of norm compliance
to both the agents that follow the norms as well as those who do not follow the
norms.
4.3 Imitation mechanism
The philosophy behind an imitation mechanism is When in Rome, do as Ro-
mans do [3]. These models are characterized by agents mimicking the behaviour
of what the majority of the agents do in a given agent society (following the
crowd). Epstein’s main argument for an imitation mechanism is that individual
thought (i.e. the amount of computing needed by a agent to infer what the norm
is) is inversely related to the strength of a social norm [3]. This implies that when
a norm becomes entrenched the agent can follow it without much thought. Ep-
stein has demonstrated this in the context of a driving scenario in which agents
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can observe each other’s driving preference (left or right) based on a certain ob-
servation radius r. If the agent sees more agents driving on the right within the
observation radius,it changes to the right. When a norm is established, the ra-
dius tends to move towards one. Other researchers have also experimented with
imitation models [36,40,44]. This might be a good mechanism when agents want
to avoid the cost of thinking about what the norm of the society is. An agent
using the imitation model is not involved in the creation of the norm, it is just
a part of the norm spreading effort. Though simple, the model can only account
for a way to spread the norm (which is blindly following it). It has been noted
that imitation approach cannot bring about the co-existence of multiple norms
in a society [45, 46]. Also, it is debatable if imitation-based behaviour (solely)
really leads to norms as there is no notion of common expectation.
4.4 Off-line design approach
Off-line design models are characterized by the agents of the society possessing
explicit knowledge of the norm. The intention of the designer specified approach
is to see how the society performs when the whole society possesses a norm.
One of the well-known works on norms specified by the designer is Shoham
and Tennenholtz [9]. They have experimented with norms associated with traf-
fic. Several other researchers [29, 43, 47] have experimented with an off-line de-
sign approach borrowing the basic experimental set-up proposed by Conte and
Castelfranchi [47]. Conte and Castelfranchi have shown using their simulation
experiments what the function of a norm is in the context of agents finding food
in a grid environment characterized by simple rules for movement and food col-
lection. They have compared the utilitarian strategy with the normative strategy.
They have shown that norms reduce the aggression level of the agent (i.e. when
a finder-keeper norm is followed) and also increase the average strength of an
agent.
4.5 Works based on machine learning
Several researchers have experimented with agents finding a norm based on learn-
ing on the part of an agent [2, 29, 48]. Shoham and Tennenholtz have used a
mechanism called co-learning which is a simple reinforcement learning mecha-
nism. They have used the “Highest Cumulative Reward (HCR)” rule to update
an agent’s strategy when playing a simple coordination game and a cooperation
game (prisoner’s dilemma). According to this rule, an agent chooses the strat-
egy that has yielded the highest reward in the past m iterations. The history of
the strategies chosen and the rewards for each strategy is stored in a memory
of a certain size (which can be varied). Walker and Wooldridge’s experimental
model [29] is based on the work done by Conte and Castelfranchi [47] where
agents move about a grid in search of food. They have experimented with 16
mechanisms for norm emergence. Their model used two parameters, the major-
ity and the strategic update function. Each of these parameters can be varied
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with four values. 16 experiments were based on size of the majority (simple, dou-
ble, quadruple, dynamic) and the nature of the update function (using majority
rule, memory restart, communication type and communication on success). Sen
and Airiau [48] have proposed a mechanism for the emergence of norms through
social learning. They have experimented with three reinforcement learning algo-
rithms and the agents learn norms based on private local interactions. They have
observed that when the population size is bigger the norm convergence is slower
and larger the set of possible action states the slower is the convergence. They
have also studied the influence of adding agents with a particular action state to
a pool of existing agents as well as norm emergence in isolated sub-populations.
Learning mechanisms employ a particular algorithm to identify a strategy
that maximizes an agent’s utility and the chosen strategy is declared as the
norm. Since all agents in the society make use of the same algorithm, the soci-
ety stabilizes to a uniform norm. Agents using this approach cannot distinguish
between a strategy and a norm. The agents do not have a notion of norma-
tive expectation (i.e. others expect certain behaviour on the part of an agent)
associated with a norm.
4.6 Cognitive approach
Researchers involved in the EMIL project [33] are working on a cognitive archi-
tecture for norm emergence. There have been some attempts to explore how the
mental capacities of agents play a role in the emergence of norms.
EMIL project aims to deliver a simulation-based theory of norm-innovation,
where norm-innovation is defined as a 2-way dynamics of inter-agent process and
intra-agent process. The inter-agent process results in the emergence of norms
where the micro interactions produce macro behaviour (norms). The intra-agent
process refers to what goes inside an agent’s mind so that they can recognize
what the norms of the society are. This approach is different from the learning
models as the agents in the cognitive approach are autonomous and have the
capability to examine interactions between agents and are able to recognize what
the norms could be. The agents in this model need not necessarily be utility
maximizing like the ones in the learning models. The agents in the model will
have the ability to filter external requests that affect normative decisions and
will also be able to communicate norms with other agents. Agents just employing
learning algorithms lack these capabilities.
Andrighetto et al. [36] have demonstrated how the norm recognition module
of the EMIL-A platform answers the question “how does a agent come to know
of what a norm is”. In particular they have experimented with an imitation ap-
proach versus the norm recognition approach that they have come up with. The
norm recognition module consists of two constructs, the normative board and a
module for storing different types of modals for norms. Each modal represents
a type of message that is exchanged between agents (e.g. deontics modal refers
to partitioning situations as either acceptable or unacceptable). The normative
board consists of normative beliefs and normative goals. They have shown that
norm recognizers perform better than social conformers (imitating agents) by
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the fact that the recognizers were able to identify a pool of potential norms
while the imitators generated only one type of norm.
The limitation of this approach is that agents just observe actions performed
by other agents. In practice they should be able to learn from their own expe-
rience as well. Perhaps, their own experience can be given a higher weight. At
present, agents in their model do not have the capability of violating the norms
and hence there are no costs associated with sanctions. The authors note this
can be a potential extension.
4.7 Emotion based works
Based on the previous work done by Scheve et al. [20], Fix et al. [21] discuss
the micro-macro linkage between emotions at the micro-level and the norm en-
forcement at the macro-level. The authors argue that emotions have a norm
regulatory function in agent societies. An agent observing a deviation of a norm
might generate emotions such as contempt or disgust which can be the motiva-
tion behind sanctions. Those agents that are sanctioned might generate emotions
such as shame, guilt or embarrassment which might lead to norm internaliza-
tion. The authors have used a Petri net model [49] to capture the micro-macro
linkage. It should be noted that the proposed model has not been implemented
in the context of a simulation experiment. Staller and Petta [50] have extended
Conte et al.’s experimental set up by including emotion based strategies.
4.8 Works using network topologies
Social networks are important for norm spreading and emergence because in the
real world, people are not related to each other by chance. They are related to
each other through the social groups that they are in, such as the work group,
church group, ethnic group and hobby group. Information tends to percolate
among the members of the group through interactions. Also, people seek advice
from a close group of friends and hence information gets transmitted between
the members of the social network.
In most simulation works, the treatment of norms has been mostly in the
context of an agent society where the agents interact with all the other agents
in the society [10, 31] in a random fashion. Few researchers have considered the
actual topologies of the social network for norm emergence [44]. We believe such
an approach is important for the study of norm spreading and emergence as
networks provide the topology and the infrastructure on which the norms can
be exchanged. Researchers have studied different kinds of network topologies and
their applications in the real world (a overview of different topologies is given
by Mitchell [51]). These application areas include opinion dynamics [52] and
the spread of diseases [53]. Researchers in normative multi-agent systems have
started to look at the role of network topologies [44,54–56]. Network topologies
have also been explored by other multi-agent system researchers in other contexts
such as reputation management [57,58].
13
Research that has considered network topologies can be categorized into
static and dynamic network topology approaches. In the static approach, the
network topology is fixed. In the dynamic topology approach, the underlying
network can change when the simulation experiments are conducted.
Works using a static network topology - Kittock was the first to experi-
ment with the role of network topology in convention emergence [54]. He noted
that the choice of the global structure has a profound effect on the evolution of
the system. Pujol’s PhD thesis [44] dealt with the emergence of conventions on
top of social structures. He used the HCR mechanism proposed by Shoham and
Tennenholtz [2] to test norm emergence in connected, random, small world and
scale-free networks. He also demonstrated that the structure of the network is
crucial for norm emergence. Nakamaru and Levin [46] studied how two related
norms evolve in networked environments. Anghel et al. [59] investigated the ef-
fects of inter-agent communication across a network in the context of playing
minority game. They have shown that a scale-free leadership structure emerges
on top of a random network.
Dynamic topology works - Very few researchers have investigated the role
of dynamic network topologies on norm spreading and emergence. Savarimuthu
et al. [55] used Gonzalez et al.’s model [60] to create dynamic network topologies.
Gonzalez et al. have developed a model for constructing dynamically changing
networks. They have used the concept of agents (or particles) colliding in an
abstract social space to construct evolving networks. Savarimuthu et al. [55]
have created dynamic network topologies using Gonzalez’s model on which they
test their role model agent-based leadership mechanism. They have shown how
different types of norms emerge when societies with different norms for the same
context (playing the Ultimatum game [61]) are brought together. In particular,
they have shown that under certain conditions norms can co-exist in an agent
society.
4.9 Cultural and evolutionary mechanisms
Researchers have also proposed other mechanisms for norm spreading and emer-
gence. These include cultural and evolutionary models [62, 63]. Boyd and Rich-
erson [62] have proposed that norms can be propagated through cultural trans-
mission. According to them, there are three ways by which a social norm can be
propagated from one member of the society to another. They are
– Vertical transmission (from parents to offspring)
– Oblique transmission (from a leader of a society to the followers)
– Horizontal transmission (from peer to peer interactions)
Of these three kinds of norm transmission mechanisms, vertical and oblique
transmissions can be thought of as leadership mechanisms in which a powerful
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superior convinces the followers to adopt a norm. The horizontal transmission
is a peer-to-peer mechanism where agents learn from day-to-day interactions
from other peers. Few researchers have used this idea to experiment with norm
spreading [31,64].
A few researchers have experimented with norm spreading based on evolution
where the offsprings inherit the behaviour of the parents. One well known work
in this category is Axelrod’s [19]. Few other researchers have also experimented
with evolutionary models for norm spreading [56,63]. Chalub et al. [63] have ex-
perimented on how norms might spread in different societies (e.g. an archipelago
of islands). Agents in an island are fully connected to each other. Each agent
plays the donor-receiver game once with all other agents in the island. Then an
agent reproduces by choosing a connected agent at random and comparing the
payoff. If its payoff is higher than the other agent, then the other agent inherits
the strategy of the winning player. Each island has a Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) which is a normalized average payoff of the entire island. Islands compete
against each other. There are times of war and peace. During peace times, the
norms of the islands do not change. When the islands are at war, they play the
Hawk and Dove [65] game. The losers change their norm based on a probabilistic
norm update rule. The authors note that a meta-norm is established at the end
of each run. One limitation of this approach is that they assume that norms have
somehow been internalized by a parent/propagator.
Table 1 shows the mechanisms used by the various simulation works on norms
corresponding to each phase of the norm life-cycle. It should be noted that not
all phases of norm life-cycle have been taken into account by most works.
5 Conclusions
This paper has made two contributions to normative multi-agent system field
in the context of simulation of norms. Firstly, a four phase model of the norm
life-cycle was proposed. Secondly, various norm-based simulation works were
categorized based on the mechanisms employed by each of the works. In the
future, we intend to elaborate the research that has been carried out using each
of the mechanisms discussed in this paper and also compare their strengths
and weaknesses. We will also compare the simulation works based on the agent
characteristics employed in each of the works. We also intend to discuss the
research issues that need to be addressed.
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Simulation works Norm cre-
ation
Norm sp-
reading
Norm en-
forcement
Norm
emergence
Axelrod, 1986 - Evolutionary
approach
Sanction Yes
Shoham and Tennen-
holtz, 1992
Learning - - Yes
Kittock, 1993 - Learning, net-
work topology
- Yes
Conte and Castelfranchi,
1995
Off-line - - -
Walker and Woolridge,
1995
- Learning - Yes
Shoham and Tennen-
holtz, 1995
Off-line - - -
Castelfranchi et al., 1998 Off-line - Reputation -
Verhagen, 2000 Leadership Leadership - -
Epstein, 2001 - Imitation - Yes
Flentge et al., 2001 - Cultural
transmission
Sanction Yes
Hales, 2002 Off-line - Reputation -
Hoffmann, 2003 Entrepre-
neurship
leadership - Yes
Lopez et al., 2003 Off-line - Sanction and
reward
-
Nakamaru and Levin,
2004
Off-line Network
topology
- Yes
Chalub et al., 2006 - Evolutionary
approach
- Yes
Fix et al., 2006 - - Emotion -
Pujol, 2006 - Learning, net-
work topology
- Yes
Sen and Airiau, 2007 - Learning - Yes
Savarimuthu et al., 2007
b,c
- Leadership,
network
topology
- Yes
Andrighetto et al., 2008,
Campenni et al., 2008
Cognition Imitation - Yes
Table 1. Mechanisms employed by simulation works in each phase of the norm life-
cycle
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